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National Identity, Partisanship and Populist Protest  
as Factors in the 1999 Australian Republic Referendum  
 
 
Using survey data from the Australian Constitutional Referendum Study 1999 
(ACRS99), I begin by showing that the votes of direct electionists were as important as 
those of monarchists in the defeat of the Republic referendum. Since these votes were 
crucial to the outcome, I then discuss several possible explanations of what 
differentiated those direct electionists who voted against the referendum proposal from 
those who voted in favour. Explanations considered include partisan influences, 
populist protest, and the role of national identity and ancestry. I find that all had a part 
to play in distinguishing the direct electionists who supported the referendum from 
those who did not, with the protest aspect being related to conceptions of national 
identity and capable of being interpreted as a reaction against multiculturalism. I also 
consider future prospects and argue that eventually some sort of direct election 
outcome is likely. 
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National Identity, Partisanship and Populist Protest  
as Factors in the 1999 Australian Republic Referendum 
 
Introduction 
There was a great deal of speculative analysis and commentary immediately following 
the defeat of the Republic referendum of 6 November 1999, and in this paper I use 
data from the Australian Constitutional Referendum Study 1999 (Gow et al. 2000) to 
provide empirical assessments of some of the most important questions about the 
failure of the referendum proposal to be passed. I begin by dealing with one of the key 
issues identified by Irving (2000), that of whether the defeat of the referendum 
indicates a desire to not change the Constitution or whether it indicates a preference 
for a direct election method of selecting the head of state.  
This obviously has implications for future developments and processes. So too does 
another important (and perhaps related) question, that of whether the existence of (at 
least) three options (the existing situation; Parliamentary appointment of a President; 
direct election of a President) could lead to a ‘cyclical majority’ outcome, where none 
of the options is capable of obtaining a majority because adherents of the remaining 
options will combine to ensure its defeat. Based on close examination of the ACRS99 
responses, I argue that this is unlikely and that any future successful republican 
outcome is most likely to involve some form of directly-elected President.  
 
In addition to there having been a clear overall majority in favour of having a directly-
elected President, almost half of these direct electionists were not prepared to support 
the Parliamentary-appointment option offered in the referendum. It was essentially the 
votes of this subgroup (in conjunction with those preferring to retain the existing 
arrangements) that led to the defeat. Since this group played such a significant part in 
defeating the referendum proposal, it is crucial to have an understanding of the factors 
that differentiated them from those who preferred direct election but who nevertheless 
voted ‘Yes’.  
Most of the rest of the article is spent discussing suggested differentiating factors, 
including giving an especially extensive discussion of the role of national identity that 
builds on some of the survey work on Australian national identity that has been carried 
out in recent years.  
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Head of State preferences 
A starting point for much of the commentary on the outcome of the referendum has 
been the obvious discrepancy between its outcome and the opinion polls that 
consistently showed an overwhelming majority of voters (in the order of 60-70%) in 
support of becoming a republic. The Head of State preferences of voters are a key 
factor in examining this and Table 1 shows the distribution of preferences for those 




TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
It is immediately clear that an overall majority (55%) favoured direct election. 
Moreover, a large majority of supporters of both other groups (i.e. both those 
favouring Parliamentary appointment and those favouring retaining the Queen as head 
of state) had direct election as their second preference. Overall, in fact, direct election 
was the third preference of less than 10% of respondents. A consequence is that there 
was no ‘cycling’ evident at the referendum. The rational choice analysis in Mitchell 
(2000) showing that preferences over the republic issue were single-peaked provides 
further support for this conclusion. 
 
McAllister (2000) argues that it might be hard to find an accommodation between 
voters’ preferences for direct election and those of political elites for something like 
parliamentary appointment, and both Higley and Evans Case (2000) and Tranter 
(2000) also suggest that a direct election option will continue to be unacceptable to 
political elites. It is true that, since direct election was not an available option in the 
referendum, the support for it has not been subjected to a stringent test. Also, public 
opinion can be modified by carefully structured, lengthy campaigns. Nevertheless, the 
fact that so few respondents placed direct election as their least-preferred option does 
quite strongly suggest to me that a successful outcome will need to involve some sort 
of direct election model, even if one with a tightly circumscribed role for a president.  
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Moving on to consider the referendum vote, as well as the majority support for a 
republic, 70% of ACRS99 respondents strongly agreed with the statement that “Our 
head of state should be an Australian” (and a further 19% agreed, with less than 3% 
disagreeing or strongly disagreeing). In the light of these overwhelming majorities, 
what was the key to obtaining the apparently unlikely ‘No’ vote in the referendum?  
Fundamental to this must be the association between referendum vote and head of state 
preference order. Other things being equal, first preferences for Parliamentary-
appointment and retaining the Queen should go together with  ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ votes, 
respectively. In the case of a first preference for direct election, we would anticipate 
that the second preference would usually determine the vote, although other 
considerations such as tactical voting or partisan influences might be important enough 
for some voters to lead to apparent inconsistencies between head of state preferences 
and vote.  
 
 




For the most part, voting actually was consistent with head of state preference for 
those whose first preference was either Parliamentary appointment or retention of the 
Queen and Governor-General (see Table 2). Particularly among the direct electionists, 
however, there were some apparent inconsistencies. The most notable of these is that 
17% of those with the Direct election/Queen preference order nevertheless voted in 
favour, in spite of the fact that a successful referendum outcome would have given 
them neither of these preferences. Other factors such as partisan influences (examined 
below) are a probable explanation for this inconsistency.  
In numerical terms, this group is roughly counterbalanced by the 16% of Direct 
election/Parliament respondents who voted against the proposal. In this case, the 
inconsistency might be explained by tactical voting i.e. these voters might have 
believed that direct election would be a future possibility as long as the 1999 proposal 
was defeated.  
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The significance of direct electionists in defeating the referendum is highlighted by the 
fact that just over half of the ‘No’ vote apparently came from this source. This clearly 
demonstrates the importance of tactics during the campaign in identifying this group 
and in persuading its members to vote against the referendum proposal. It is therefore a 
primary task in explaining the referendum outcome to understand what factors 
distinguish the group. Consequently, in the rest of this article I will focus on the direct 
electionists, examining what distinguished those who voted ‘No’ (and hence were 
instrumental in defeating the proposal) from those who voted ‘Yes’2. 
 
Partisan influences 
Both in the general area of voting behaviour and in the specific setting of Australian 
referendum voting, partisan influences usually play a large part. It had been ALP 
policy since the early 1990s to support the introduction of a republic by 2001 (the 
Centenary of Federation) and, although there had been some divisions within the ALP 
over the method of election, their leading federal politicians (including their leader 
Kim Beazley) supported the referendum proposal. On the other hand, Liberal federal 
politicians were quite divided, though in their case the main division was between 
those supporting the status quo (including the Prime Minister, John Howard) and those 
favouring the Parliamentary-appointment option (including the Liberal deputy leader, 
Peter Costello).  
 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Consequently, to the extent that partisanship influenced voting, one would expect ALP 
partisans would have been more likely to support the proposal than Liberal partisans. 
This has, in fact, been shown to be the case when one considers voters overall, whether 
partisanship is measured by party identification (Charnock 2000; Tranter 2000) or by 
leader evaluations and 1998 federal election vote (McAllister 2000). Unlike amongst 
the party elites, direct electionists predominate amongst voters in all parties3 (ranging 
upwards from the 47% among National identifiers: see Table 3).  
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There are, though, some partisan differences amongst the electorate in head of state 
preferences, and it is not clear a priori that partisanship would influence referendum 
voting in the same way when attention is restricted to direct electionists. It would be a 
plausible suggestion, for example, that the factors that lead voters to be direct 
electionists would often be powerful enough to override partisan effects. 
 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
However, there are actually clear relationships between party identification and 
referendum vote amongst direct electionists also (see Table 4), and they are generally 
of the same size and direction as those observed when all voters are considered. There 
is only one that differs in any significant way, and that is that Liberal direct electionists 
were more likely to vote in favour (46%) than were Liberal identifiers generally 
(36%). Although I have not shown the corresponding analyses here, this is largely a 
reflection of the corresponding head of state preferences: the second preferences of 
Liberal direct electionists were more heavily weighted towards Parliamentary 
appointment than were the first preferences of Liberal identifiers overall.  
 
Clearly, then, partisan influences were also quite apparent among direct electionists, 
with ALP identifiers being more likely than Liberal identifiers to vote in favour. The 
differences are significant, but they obviously do not provide a complete explanation 
of what distinguishes the direct electionists who voted ‘No’ from those who voted 
‘Yes’, and other factors must also have been important. 
 
Populist Protest  
One of the most commonly expressed suggestions for the referendum defeat has been 
that it reflected a populist protest derived from mistrust of, and dissatisfaction with, 
politicians and the political process. In the recent general political context, this has 
often been linked to the economic and social impacts of globalisation and has 
sometimes been put in the context of an urban-rural cleavage or of a ‘cosmopolitans’ v 
‘parochials’ divide involving the notion of a ‘new class’ composed of an educated, 
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mobile, urban elite (cf. Betts 1999 and several of the contributors in Abbott et al. 
1998). In the specific context of the referendum, it is associated with the notion that 
the Republic was an elite issue (see, for example, Higley and Evans Case 2000; 
McAllister 2000), an argument which was used very effectively in negative portrayals 
of Malcolm Turnbull and the Australian Republican Movement during the referendum 
campaign.  
If these suggestions are accurate, then there should be both socio-demographic and 
attitudinal differences apparent in voting at the referendum. For example, groups said 
to suffer from the impact of globalisation, such as rural dwellers, those on lower 
incomes, those with lower levels of formal education and in lower status occupations 
should have been less likely to vote in favour of the referendum proposal. The same 




TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
With respect to the socio-demographic effects (see Table 5), some of these aspects do 
distinguish the two groups of direct electionists from each other, with rural residence, 
non-possession of higher educational qualifications and being in lower status 
occupations all increasing the chances of voting ‘No’.  However, many other 
differences are small or non-existent, and it is also noteworthy that the only differences 
that are larger for direct electionists than for voters as a whole are based on country of 
birth (specifically, those for the Australian- and Southern European-born). 
 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The ‘Republic as elite initiative’ hypothesis is quite strongly supported by the 
responses to the question about the Republic debate being a distraction from real 
problems, with the direct electionists who voted against the referendum being much 
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more likely to agree that it was a distraction (see Table 6)4. Clearly, proponents of a 
republic will need to argue the positive merits of the proposal better in future if voters 
such as these are to be persuaded to support the idea.  
On the other hand, although there is a tendency for the direct electionists who voted 
‘No’ to have somewhat lower levels of efficacy and trust, the differences are generally 
small. Consequently, these factors are not useful for distinguishing the two groups of 
direct electionists from each other. This is noteworthy: although a reaction to the 
republic issue in particular was significant, it appears that a more generalised political 
dissatisfaction was not an important distinguishing factor, contrary to many previous 
suggestions. 
  
In passing, I would like to note one particularly ironic feature of the referendum 
outcome. Compared to ‘Yes’ voters, among the ‘No’ voters there was a 
disproportionate number of people who said they would definitely or probably have 
not voted had it not been compulsory to do so. Consequently, the question would have 
come much closer to obtaining an overall majority if voting had not been compulsory 
(and may even have passed). This is rather ironic, since Senator Minchin played such a 




Given the nature of the referendum proposal and the main theme of the ‘Yes’ 
campaigners (“ ‘Yes’ for our republic and an Australian head of state”), issues about 
the nature of Australian national identity are obviously likely to have been critical for 
some people. In some cases this would come from aspects that might be directly 
related to the proposal: among these would be attachments to the historic ties with 
Britain (including to the Queen and Royal family) and to symbols such as the national 
flag and national anthem6.  
In addition to these aspects that were directly related to the proposal, there are more 
diffuse ones that form part of questions about the nature of Australian national 
identity. In this vein, Warhurst (1993, 100) argues that ‘…for Australia the question of 
a republic is a nationalist issue’ and quotes Bob Hawke (ALP Prime Minister from 
1983 to 1991) as having said during his 1979 Boyer Lectures that ‘for reasons of 
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national identity I would prefer to break the link with the British Crown’ (Warhurst 
1993, 115).  
More recently, Paul Keating has been seen as having driven the debate about national 
identity during his years as Prime Minister and this has also been argued as intimately 
connected with the Republic debate (e.g. Leithner 1994). Following Keating’s 
initiatives, the range of the debate was broadened to include people’s attitudes to 
aboriginal issues, migrants and multiculturalism. Empirical support for the existence of 
connections between the republic issue and these aspects amongst the Australian 
electorate is provided by Jackman (1998), who finds not only that questions about 
aboriginal and migrant issues load together on the same (racial) dimension, but also 
that this dimension is fairly highly correlated with a republican dimension7.  
 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
Several of these aspects were apparent in voting at the referendum and are reflected in 
Table 7. The largest differences involve those who are more conservative on 
constitutional ties with Britain and the Queen and on symbols such as the flag. Such 
people are considerably more common among the direct electionists who voted ‘No’ 
than among those who voted ‘Yes’, and this seems to be one of the most significant 
factors differentiating the two groups of direct electionists. 
At first sight, this is somewhat contradictory: on the one hand, the expressed attitudes 
of this group are quite conservative (which helps to explain their ‘No’ vote), but on the 
other hand their preference for direct election as first choice expresses support for what 
would potentially be a very radical change. It could, however, be taken to support the 
notion of a protest vote among the members of the group; this interpretation is 
reinforced by the fact (noted previously) that those in the group were much more likely 
to think the republic debate was a distraction from real problems. 
 
However, since the source of such a protest does not (based on the analysis above) 
appear to be a generalised political dissatisfaction, it is necessary to identify what the 
source might be. Analyses in both of Charnock (1999) and McAllister and Bean 
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(2000) suggest that attitudes towards migrants and aborigines played an important role 
in attracting voters to the One Nation Party at the 1998 federal election. Combined 
with Jackman’s (1998) conclusions mentioned above, this suggests that at least a 
partial source for the protest vote is likely to be found in some of the more diffuse 
aspects of national identity.  
As Table 7 shows quite clearly, questions about things such as attitudes towards 
migrants do indeed serve to differentiate direct electionists who voted against from 
those who voted in favour, with the former having more negative attitudes. Taken 
together with the significant country of birth differences noted earlier, this suggests 
that a more extensive examination of the role of national identity is likely to provide 
some valuable insights into voting behaviour at the referendum (and also possibly have 
some relevance for understanding the sources of recent protest voting more generally). 
 
Phillips (1998) provides a useful review of recent quantitative survey research in the 
area of Australian national identity, finding just over ten studies8. Of particular interest 
here are some analyses of responses to people’s conceptions of what aspects are 
important in being ‘truly Australian’9. McAllister (1997) concluded that achieved 
rather than ascribed attributes were overall rated as more important, while Jones 
(1997) derived a typology of Australians based on their responses. Using factor 
analysis, he found that the aspects could be subdivided into three scales, one involving 
ascribed attributes (being Australian-born, Christian and having lived in Australia for 
most of one’s life) and which he described as measuring an Australian nativism 
dimension, the second (based on feeling Australian and respecting Australian laws and 
political institutions) which he described as measuring an affective dimension of civic 
culture and a third (based on possessing citizenship and being able to speak English) 
which he found acted as a behavioural bridge between the other two dimensions and 
which he described as measuring an instrumental dimension of civic culture. Based on 
the first two of these scales he identified four main groups within the population, 
which he named as follows: 
 
Dogmatic Nativists: (strong nativism and strong affective civic culture) 
Literal Nativists: (strong nativism and weak to moderate affective civic culture) 
Civic Nationalists: (weak to moderate nativism and strong affective civic culture) 
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Moderate Pluralists: (weak to moderate on both nativism and affective civic culture). 
 
In the context of the Republic referendum, this typology10 can be used to add some 
analytic precision to some of the previous explanations and also to add a new 
dimension. For example, it seems to provide a more careful empirical investigation 
into some important aspects of the arguments used by Betts (1999), especially of the 
distinction between ‘cosmopolitans’ and ‘parochials’. In this framework, one would 
probably associate the ‘cosmopolitans’ most closely with the ‘moderate pluralists’: if 
the suggestion that the republic referendum was mainly important to mobile, urban, 
educated elites is accurate, then this group should have been more likely to vote ‘yes’. 
On the other hand, at face value (based on nationalist sentiment) one would expect 
nativists to have been more likely to support the referendum (‘…an Australian head of 
state’), so failure to do so would indicate the kind of protest mentioned earlier. 
 
 
TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
In fact, a straightforward examination (see Table 8) makes it clear that among direct 
electionists (as well as among voters as a whole) the two nativist groups were 
considerably more likely to have voted against the referendum proposal. Perceptions 
of national identity are, therefore, quite effective in distinguishing the two groups of 
direct electionists from each other.  
As the lower section of Table 8 indicates, while the nativist groups were more likely 
than the two other identity groups to favour retaining the status quo, a majority of both 
nativist groups actually selected direct election as their first choice (and, in fact, the 
Literal Nativists had the highest percentage of direct electionists among all of the four 
groups). In addition, members of both groups of nativists were extremely unlikely to 
select Parliamentary appointment as first preference. This again seems to support a 
protest vote interpretation.  
Reinforcing this even more, analyses (not shown here) that also incorporate party 
identification show that, while ALP identifiers in the Civic Nationalist and Moderate 
Pluralist groups were considerably more likely than Coalition identifiers to select 
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Parliamentary appointment as first preference, there was no such difference among the 
nativist groups; this further suggests that the nativist aspect is associated with protest 




TABLE 9 ABOUT HERE 
 
What is the source of this protest vote? Does it derive from generalised political 
dissatisfaction or from something more specific, such as a reaction against the 
perceived special treatment of aborigines and migrants and the notion of a 
multicultural society? The large attitudinal variations apparent in Table 9 support the 
latter explanation. There are large contrasts between the groups, with the Moderate 
Pluralists and Dogmatic Nativists tending to be at opposite poles11. The former have a 
much weaker attachment to Australia than the other groups, and they are generally the 
least conservative. They are also more likely to have an individualistic view of society. 
In contrast, the Dogmatic Nativists are the most strongly attached to Australia, are the 
most conservative and  have the most community-oriented view of society. There are 
also significant differences in attitudes towards migrants and aborigines. 
 
 
TABLE 10 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
The sociodemographic backgrounds of the Moderate Pluralists and Civic Nationalists 
are very similar to each other (see Table 10), including having the highest education 
levels and occupational status. One notable exception to this is in residential location, 
where it is the Literal Nativist and Moderate Pluralist groups that are more likely to 
live in large towns and cities; for direct electionists, therefore, the affective civic 
culture dimension seems more important than the nativism one in differentiating 
between areas of residence.  
Some aspects of the backgrounds of the two nativist groups are quite similar, although 
the Dogmatic Nativists among the direct electionists have a number of indicators of 
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having the lowest socioeconomic status (income levels, education levels, occupational 
status and working class self-identification). Some of these (such as in the areas of 
education and income) are probably related to the older ages of the Dogmatic Nativists 
(half of whom were aged over 50 years). A surprising feature is that the nativist groups 
are more likely to be female (particularly the Literal Nativists, only 40% of whom are 
male). 
There are some large differences in ancestry backgrounds between the identity groups, 
with both nativist groups being considerably more likely to be Australian-born, 
especially third-generation. The fact that there is little difference between first- and 
second-generation distributions of national identity categories suggests that having at 
least one overseas-born parent has a significant effect on attitudes about national 
identity.  
Religious attachment (whether measured by religious denomination or attendance) is 
much more likely to be present among both nativist groups, and about a quarter of both 
Moderate Pluralist and Civic Nationalist groups state they have no religion. This has a 
parallel in partisan attachments, with some practically significant variations in levels 
of major party identification (around 85% in the nativist groups and 75% in the others) 
that mainly result from differences in levels of non-identification.  
When considered in conjunction with the differences in education levels and the fact 
that the area of residence variations cut across the nativism dimension, this indicates 
that an interpretation in terms of values is more appropriate in aiding understanding of 
the referendum’s defeat than is one based on an urban-rural divide.  
 
All of this supports the conclusion that there was a significant element of protest 
among the nativist groups resulting from a reaction against the ‘republic as elite 
initiative’ perception. We have seen that these groups are disproportionately third 
generation Australian and appear to have a vision of society which is more 
assimilationist and antagonistic towards multiculturalism. Consequently, another 
distinguishing feature is that their discontent is expressed in more negative attitudes 
towards perceived special treatment of migrants and aborigines. As before, it was these 
specific attitudes, rather than a generalised sense of political dissatisfaction, that best 
helps to explain the protest vote.  
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Multivariate analyses  
Separate analyses of the different factors, then, show that partisanship, populist protest 
in reaction to perceptions that the issue was driven by elites, and conceptions of 
national identity and ancestry all help to distinguish the direct electionists who did not 
support the referendum from those who did. However, a generalised political 
dissatisfaction did not do so, and the protest vote seems to be connected to some 
aspects of the national identity and ancestry component.  
Multivariate analysis which takes many factors simultaneously into account confirms 
these findings (see Table 11). The strongest effect of any single variable was that for  
 
 
TABLE 11 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
party identification, with ALP identification making direct electionists more likely to 
vote in favour than other direct electionists. National identity also showed a significant 
effect, with nativist groups among the direct electionists being less likely to support 
the proposal than the other identity groups. In addition to an indirect impact through 
these national identity perceptions, country of birth also had a direct effect, with 
Southern European-born direct electionists being much more likely to support the 
proposal than the Australian- or British-born. The significance of this ‘cluster’ of 
variables related to national identity and ancestry is emphasised by the effect of 
attitudes towards both migrants and retaining ties to Britain, with the former also being 
capable of being interpreted as forming part of the anti-elite reaction. Interestingly, 
attitudes towards aborigines are not significant; this is probably because negative 
attitudes in the area are widespread and hence do not serve to differentiate the groups 
as well as do those towards migrants. 
 
When the influences of other variables are controlled for, only two of the socio-
demographic variables (religious denomination and education level) were significant 
in distinguishing the two groups of direct electionists from each other, and both could 
be interpreted in terms of values. The largest effect was for possession of higher 
education qualifications, which made direct electionists more likely to vote ‘Yes’. In 
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the case of religion, although having a stated affiliation with a religious denomination 
generally increased the chances of voting ‘No’ compared to secularists who rejected a 
religious denomination of any kind, few are by statistically significant amounts, and 
one is actually in the opposite direction (Orthodox, re-emphasising the significance of 
ethnic influences).  
Although age, area of residence, self-identified social class and generalised political 
dissatisfaction were all significant in distinguishing  ‘Yes’ from ‘No’ voters overall 
(Charnock 2000, Table 10), none of them were important for distinguishing among 
direct electionists. Furthermore, the religious denomination effects are much smaller 
among direct electionists. These comparisons suggest that, in interpreting the impact of 
social background effects on differentiating direct electionists who voted ‘No’, a 
values-based interpretation deriving from education influences is the one that is more 
fundamental.  
 
Conclusion and prospects 
The analyses presented here of voters’ preferences for Head of State selection methods 
clearly show that the Republic referendum was defeated only because of the votes of a 
large proportion (almost half) of the direct electionists. It appears, in fact, that slightly 
over half of the ‘No’ vote actually came from this source. Consequently, in terms of 
tactics, identification of the group of direct electionists who voted against the proposal 
was crucial, and an understanding of the features that distinguished this group from 
other direct electionists is essential to assessing future prospects.  
 
There seem to be three main aspects that were relevant, two of which are interrelated. 
The strongest is the traditionally important influence of partisanship: the role of the 
political parties was significant, with a proportion of voters apparently following their 
parties or party leaders against their own expressed head of state preference. Since it 
seems probable that future Liberal leaders will be more likely than Mr Howard to 
support a republic, this factor will probably be more favourable to a republic in future.  
 
There was another set of influences that was almost as strong as partisanship, ones that 
are related to conceptions of national identity and ancestry. Drawing on a typology 
developed by Jones (1997) that divides the population into four groups on the basis of 
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their perceptions of national identity, I was able to show that the association between 
the referendum vote and these identity groups was quite strong, being not much 
weaker than that between the vote and party identification. The nature of the 
association was that those groups that were strongly nativist were considerably more 
likely to vote ‘No’ than were the others. This suggests a protest vote, because prima 
facie one would have expected strong nativists to be most in support of having an 
Australian as head of state.  
However, the source of this protest does not appear to be a sense of generalised 
political dissatisfaction. Rather, it seems to result from fundamental differences in 
social perceptions. The nativist groups are disproportionately third generation 
Australian and have a vision of Australian society which is assimilationist. As a result, 
their discontent is also expressed in negative attitudes towards perceived special 
treatment of migrants and aborigines and one could (at least partly) interpret their 
protest vote as a reaction resulting from their view of multiculturalism. It seems 
unlikely that these groups would change this perspective, and would certainly not do 
so quickly. They do, however, make up less than a quarter of the population and 
almost half were aged over 50 years.  
Furthermore, as far as the ancestry part of the set of influences is concerned, the 
British-born component of the migrant intake has declined sharply since the mid-
1970s. Consequently, the impact of the British-born (which is in favour of a ‘No’ vote) 
will presumably diminish over time. Overall, the changes in source countries for 
migrants are likely to be more favourable to a ‘Yes’ vote in future. 
 
Unquestionably, the hypothesis that there was an element of protest as a reaction 
against a perception of the republic as an elite initiative is supported by my analyses. 
As already argued, this reaction was not a product of generalised political 
dissatisfaction (at least as far as distinguishing the direct electionists who voted against 
from those who voted in favour is concerned). A focus on values, both on those related 
to education and on those involved in the differing conceptions of national identity 
held by the nativist groups, gives a more accurate reflection of the causes. There is 
some flavour of a ‘cosmopolitans’-‘parochials’ distinction, but this lacks the analytical 
clarity and rigour of the national identity typology. A simplistic spatial distinction 
based on a divide between major cities and other areas is inadequate because it ignores 
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important associated differences in social composition: for example, migrants are 
disproportionately concentrated in major cities (many countries of birth have 
concentrations in major cities of well over 90%) while, conversely, the Australian-born 
are disproportionately located outside major cities.  
 
Some of the ideas about the relationship between nativism and the protest vote could 
probably also be usefully applied to a more general voting context, and they do appear 
to help in understanding the One Nation phenomenon. However, despite the 
possibilities offered by preferential voting methods, voters would arguably be more 
likely to exercise such a protest in the setting of a referendum (especially one that 
appeared to have mainly symbolic effect) than they would be at a federal election. 
 
Given the existence of this protest factor, it seems to me that the then-forthcoming 
Centenary of Federation and the new millennium provided a context that made the 
1999 referendum a relatively easy opportunity for supporters of a republic to succeed. 
Having failed, future attempts will require much more careful thought, information 
campaigns and persuasion. The argument that an accommodation between the political 
elites and the electorate might be hard to find does need to be taken seriously but, on 
balance, I think it most likely that some kind of direct election method will eventuate 
in due course (with sufficiently tightly circumscribed roles and powers for the 
president to satisfy the political elites). Achieving the outcome would be helped by 
using a multistage process (such as the one currently proposed by the ALP i.e. an 
indicative vote for a republic, followed by discussion and selection of a model or 
models), which would allow different coalitions of supporters to be formed at each 
stage.  
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1. The ACRS99 used a disproportionate sample design, with less populous states 
being over-sampled and the most populous ones being under-sampled. All 
results presented in this paper are weighted to adjust for this. 
2. Survey-based studies of factors differentiating ‘No’ from ‘Yes’ voters overall 
(as compared to the direct electionists examined here) have been conducted by 
a number of authors (Bean 2000; Charnock 2000; McAllister 2000; Tranter 
2000). 
3. See Jackman (1998, 178-82) for a discussion of some partisan differences in 
ideological closeness between party elites and their identifiers. 
4. The fact that fewer than half of enrolled voters voted in the non-compulsory 
ballot for the elected delegates to the 1998 Constitutional Convention could be 
taken as additional evidence of lack of widespread enthusiasm. 
5. He was, for example, a key member of the Coalition majority on the Joint 
Standing Committee on Electoral Matters that recommended the abolition of 
compulsory voting at federal elections and referendums following the 
Coalition’s win at the 1996 federal election. 
6. Although neither the flag nor the national anthem would have changed as a 
result of a successful referendum vote, there were substantial minorities (of 
24% and 18%, respectively) who incorrectly thought they would change. 
7. The qualitative research reported in Phillips and Smith (2000) suggests that any 
changes in perceptions of Australian identity over the period had been quite 
minor and this supports the view that the republic debate generally (not just the 
referendum campaign) had little effect on these perceptions. 
8. In an international context, the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) 
tried for several years to develop suitable modules for their cross-national 
studies (Svallfors 1996) and eventually the 1995 round of ISSP surveys 
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included some relevant modules. As in previous rounds, the Australian 
contribution to this was provided by the National Social Science Survey 
(Kelley et al. 1995); several of the relevant questions from the modules were 
also included in the 1996 Australian Election Study (Jones et al. 1996) and 
some were included in ACRS99.  
9. The relevant question (included in all of NSSS95, AES 96 and ACRS 99) is as 
follows: 
Some people say the following things are important for being truly Australian. 
Others say they are not important. How important do you think each thing is? 
1. Being born in Australia 
2. Having Australian citizenship 
3. Living in Australia most of one’s life 
4. Being able to speak English 
5. Being Christian 
6. Respecting Australia’s political institutions and laws 
7. Feeling Australian 
[respondents were asked to indicate whether they considered each aspect to be 
very important, fairly important, not very important or not at all important]. 
10. In ACRS99 the respective sizes of the groups were Dogmatic Nativists (16%), 
Literal Nativists (6%), Civic Nationalists (39%) and Moderate Pluralists (39%). 
This distribution is almost identical to that found by Jones (1997) in his 
analysis of the NSSS95.  
11. The same is also true among all respondents (Charnock 2000, Table 7). 
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Preferences for Head of State methoda 
First and Second choices of method Percentage 
  
Direct election/Parliament 24 
Direct election/Queen 21 
Direct election onlyb 10 
Direct election first preference Total 55 
  
Parliament/Direct election 15 
Parliament/Queen   4 
Parliament onlyb   2 
Parliament first preference Total 21 
  
Queen/Direct election 16 
Queen/Parliament   4 
Queen onlyb   5 
Queen first preference Total 24 
Note: Total (weighted) N = 2087. 
a Respondents were asked: 
If you had to choose among the following possibilities for Australia, which one would be your first 
choice? And which one would be your second choice?  
1. A President directly elected by the people 
2. A President appointed by Parliament 
3. Retaining the Queen and the Governor-General 
4. Don’t Know 
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Referendum Vote for various Head of State preferences 
 Referendum Vote   
 Yes No  
Preference order for Head of State % % N (weighted) 
Direct election / Parliament 84 16 501 
Direct election / Queen 17 83 415 
Direct election only 58 42 188 
    
Parliament / Direct election 97   3 312 
Parliament / Queen 74 26   74 
Parliament only 93   7   37 
    
Queen / Direct election   1 99 321 
Queen / Parliament   3 97   81 
Queen only   4 96   92 
 
Note: Direct election = Directly elected President; Parliament = President appointed by Parliament; 
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Party Identification differences in Head of State preference 
 Head of State first preference  
  Direct Election Parliament Queen  
Party identification % % % N (weighted) 
Liberal 49 17 34 731 
Labor 60 25 15 807 
National Party 47 10 43  73 
Australian Democrats 56 34 10  80 
Greens 64 32   4  45 
One Nation 64   2 34  42 
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(among direct electionists) 
 
Referendum Vote  
(among all respondents) 
 
  Yes No Yes No 
Party identification % % % % 
Liberal 46 54 36 64 
Labor 66 34 63 37 
National Party 30 70 23 77 
Australian Democrats 66 34 70 30 
Greens 62 38 63 37 
One Nation 30 70 24 76 
No party 41 59 41 59 












Source: 1999 ACRS 
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   Voted Yes Voted No  Voted Yes Voted No Overall 
   % %  % % % 






38 47 42 
Family income more than 




57 44 51 
Degree or post graduate 
qualifications 
 19 11  27 11 19 
Managers and 
Administrators 
 10 10  12 10 11 
Professionals  19 16  24 13 19 
Labourers and production 
workers 
 15 22  12 19 16 





25 38 31 
Large town resident  18 16  15 19 17 
Major city resident  55 45  60 44 52 
Roman Catholic  30 29  27 26 27 
No religion  22 17  26 14 20 
Religious attendance less 




59 54 57 
Male  48 50  49 46 48 
Mean age (years)  45.1 46.9  44.4 49.5 47.0 
Australian-born  71 79  75 79 77 
United Kingdom- and 
Ireland-born 
 8 8   7 10 9 
Southern European-born  7 1   5  2 4 
 
Note: entries are column percentages e.g. of those direct electionists who voted ‘Yes’, 45% self-identified as 
working class, compared to 49% of those who voted ‘No’. In the full sample, 42% of respondents self-identified as 
working class, with 38% of the overall ‘Yes’ voters and 47% of the ‘No’ voters so identifying. 
 
Source: 1999 ACRS 
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TABLE 6 
Attitude (trust, efficacy, interest) variations according to Referendum Vote  
      
  Direct Electionists  All respondents 
   Voted  Yes 
Voted  
No 




  % %  % % % 
Not much or no interest in politics  20 18  15 20 17 
Would probably or definitely not have 




 5 11  8 
Not very or not at all satisfied with the 




22 22 22 





14 26 20 
Did not care very much or not at all about 




27 28 28 
Who you vote for can make a difference 
to what happens 
 66 59  70 61 65 
People in government usually look after 
themselves 
 41 51  34 47 41 
Federal politicians don't know much 




53 61 57 
Strongly agree or agree Republic debate 




33 73 53 
 
Note:  as described in the note to Table 5, entries are column percentages 
Source: 1999 ACRS 
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Attitude (national identity related) variations according to Referendum Vote  
      
  Direct Electionists  All Respondents 






 No Overall 
  % %  % % % 
Strongly favour or favour changing 
the Australian flag 
 62 25  62 15 38 
Strongly agree or agree should keep 
constitutional ties with Britain 
 18 42  17 61 39 
The Queen and Royal family are 
very or fairly important to Australia 
 11 40  11 56 34 
Very important to make special effort 
to protect ethnic and racial minorities 
 36 23  38 23 30 
Australian society should be unified 
body pursuing a common goal 
 67 76  62 78 70 
Equal opportunities for migrants 
have gone much too far 
   9 15    7 17 13 
Aboriginal land rights have gone 
much too far 
 23 36  18 36 28 
Number of migrants allowed into 
Australia has gone much too far 
 18 28  14 29 22 
Government help for aborigines has 




18 33 26 
 
Note:  as described in the note to Table 5, entries are column percentages 
Source: 1999 ACRS
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    % % % % % 
Referendum vote Voted No  (direct electionists) 58 60 43 42 46 
 Voted No  (all respondents) 68 64 47 47 52 
       
Direct election  55 59 54 56 55 
Parliament   8   7 26 23 21 
First preference for 
Head of State 
(all respondents) 
Queen 37 34 20 21       24 
 
Note:  as described in the note to Table 5, entries in the table are column percentages e.g. among direct 
electionists 58 % of the Dogmatic Nativists voted No, while among all respondents 68 % of the Dogmatic 
Nativists voted No. 
 
Source: 1999 ACRS  
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TABLE 9 
Attitudes of Australian identity groups among Direct Electionists  










  % % % % % 
Not very or not at all satisfied with the way 
democracy works in Australia 24 27 21 33 26 
Strongly agree or agree who people vote for 
can make a difference to what happens 59 50 68 59 62 
Did not care very much or not at all about 
the outcome of the Republic referendum 32 29 25 36 31 
Strongly agree or agree republic debate is a 
distraction from Australia’s real problems 60 57 48 49 51 
Queen and Royal family are very or fairly 
important to Australia 34 40 19 23 24 
Strongly favour or favour changing the 
Australian flag 34 28 47 50 45 
Strongly agree or agree should keep 
constitutional ties with Britain 40 35 25 26 28 
      
Strongly agree would rather be citizen of 
Australia than any other country in world 93 80 76 58 72 
Very proud of Australian history 55 56 41 27 38 
Strongly agree that the world would be a 
better place if people from other countries 
were more like Australians 
46 31 30 16 27 
Strongly agree that generally speaking, 
Australia is a much better country than most 
other countries 
71 60 51 32 47 
      
Very important to make a special effort to 
protect ethnic and racial minorities 30 18 31 29 29 
Ideally, Australian society should be a 
unified body pursuing a common goal 89 73 73 60 70 
Equal opportunities for migrants have gone 
much too far 24 18   8   9 12 
Aboriginal land rights have gone much too 
far 40 29 26 30 30 
Number of migrants allowed into Australia 
has gone much too far 44 34 18 20 23 
Government help for aborigines has gone 
much too far 37 29 27 27 29 
 
Note:  as described in the note to Table 5, entries in the table are column percentages 
Source: 1999 ACRS
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Sociodemographic background of Australian identity groups  
among Direct Electionists 
 










Background differences ... % % % % % 
Male 47 40 50 50 49 
Aged over 50 years 50 30 32 28 33 
Family income over $40,000 per year 34 54 55 53 51 
Working class self-identification 56 43 44 45 46 
Trade union member 23 38 27 25 26 
Government employee 23 24 24 22 23 
Left School before 16 years old 49 33 28 27 31 
Bachelor or postgraduate degree   6 12 17 18 15 
Managers and Administrators   7 10 15 12 12 
Professionals 14   8 18 20 18 
Labourers and production workers 26 17          15 14 16 
Live in Rural / village or smaller town 32 21 27 21 25 
Immigrant to Australia 14 13 25 25 23 
2nd generation Australian 16 16 21 24 21 
3rd (or higher) generation Australian 70 71 54 51 56 
Adheres to one of 5 major Christian faiths 84 88 68 66 71 
No Religion   7   5 25 24 20 
Regular church attender (at least weekly) 20 16 10 10 12 
Liberal or National identifier 37 45 36 33 35 
ALP identifier 49 40 39 42 42 
No party identification   6   7 14 14 13 
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Logistic regression for Republic Referendum Vote among Direct Electionists 
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE CATEGORIES COEFFICIENT (S.E.) 
Party Identification ALP (base) N/a 
 Liberal  0.89 (0.14)* 
 National  1.10 (0.38)* 
 Australian Democrats  0.07 (0.30) 
 Greens  0.31 (0.32) 
 One Nation  0.88 (0.38)* 
 Other party  2.71 (1.12)* 
 No party  0.97 (0.18)* 
Migrant attitudes (0-1 scale: 1=high anti-migrant)   0.65 (0.33)* 
Highest Qualification No Qualifications (base) N/a 
 Bachelor or Postgraduate degree -0.73 (0.19)* 
 Diploma -0.34 (0.21) 
 Trade qualification -0.09 (0.15) 
 Non-trade qualification -0.04 (0.17) 
Religious denomination No religion (base) N/a 
 Roman Catholic  0.16 (0.18) 
 Anglican  0.44 (0.17)* 
 Uniting/Methodist  0.32 (0.21) 
 Orthodox -1.22 (0.53)* 
 Presbyterian  0.34 (0.30) 
 Other religion  0.20 (0.23) 
Australian Identity Moderate Pluralist (base) N/a 
 Civic Nationalist  0.08 (0.12) 
 Literal Nativist  0.62 (0.24)* 
 Dogmatic Nativist  0.35 (0.17)* 
Country of Birth Australia (base) N/a 
 UK or Ireland  0.18 (0.21) 
 S. Europe -1.52 (0.49)* 
 Elsewhere -0.17 (0.19) 
Ties to Britain and the Queen 0-1 scale: 1=highly favour retention  1.17 (0.28)* 
Constant N/a -1.03 (0.27)* 
Note: r2 = 0.28; positive coefficients indicate an increased chance of voting ‘No’ at the referendum; 
 * indicates significant difference from 0 or base category (as appropriate) at a 5% level; other 
variables included in the modelling, but which were not statistically significant were scales 
measuring political dissatisfaction and attitudes towards treatment of aborigines, family income, 
self-identified social class, age, area of residence, religious attendance, employer-type, union 
membership, firearms ownership and sex. 
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Source: 1999 ACRS 
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